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 An emerging military power in Central Africa?
Chad under Idriss Déby
Roland Marchal
 
 Chad military involvement in Mali and lately in all neighboring states prompts to revisit several episodes 
of its past history at a time, observers should deal with a growing discrepancy between the unfolding 
fragility of the regime and its ambition to be a regional military power.
Idriss Déby Itno came to power in December 1990 and promised to bring democracy and freedom after 
a two-decade civil war. It was diffi cult for him to keep his words, accept a multi-party system and free 
and fair elections. Numerous opponents, some of them eager to restart armed struggle, were killed or 
“disappeared” and state authority was imposed on regions by harsh coercion. After the defeat of armed 
groups in 2008, contention in Chad has mostly taken the form of demonstrations, riots and social violence. 
It has been repressed in forceful ways by arresting civil society activists, journalists, opposition MPs and 
shooting demonstrators.
After tense fi rst years of his regime, the political atmosphere somewhat improved in the late 1990s. Libya 
was in a supporting mood and Idriss Déby needed Western backing to build a 1070 km pipeline to the 
Cameroonian port of Kribi to export oil to the international market. The year 2003 should have inaugurated 
a new page in Chad’s history as oil revenues, for the fi rst time, poured into state coffers. However, old habits 
die hard: Idriss Déby public commitment to leave power at the end of his second mandate in 2006 was 
disrespected. Moreover, N’Djamena got involved in the Darfur confl ict. The conjunction of these two crises 
built a system of confl icts that made Darfur confl ict intractable and provoked a regime crisis in Chad that 
allowed the rebels to reach the capital city in April 2006 and February 2008. Idriss Déby survived thanks 
primarily to French military backing and Libyan support. Idriss Déby decided not to keep oil money in 
foreign banks but use those funds to buy modern military hardware, expand his military apparatus and 
pay for mercenaries. The normalization with Khartoum inaugurated in June 2009 meant that Sudanese 
support to the various Chadian armed opposition groups was stopped meanwhile Idriss Déby cut his aid 
to Darfur rebellions. A new regional order was emerging without peace for the population and without 
any vital threat to the regimes in Khartoum and N’Djamena.
Idriss Déby was re-elected President in 2011 and one could have expected that oil revenues would be 
used for the best of the country, since violent competition was over. Economic and political governances 
deteriorated. Idriss Déby Itno and his wife, Hinda Mahamat Abderahim Açyl, promoted their relatives and 
clients in the high-ranking civil service, the cabinet and the business realm. In particular, the military 
apparatus became ethnically highly polarized and absolutely in the hands of the President closest relatives. 
Oil revenues were used to build infrastructures but a closer glance proved that most contracts were 
allocated to fi rst feed the patronage networks of the presidential couple. Until today, most development 
indexes have kept pessimistic even though Chad economic potential goes much beyond the oil sector. 
This model of growth over-centered on oil was eventually jeopardized by the fall of oil price in the second 
semester 2014. Despite his reelection in March 2016, Idriss Déby has been unable to mobilize external 
support enough to compensate the drastic shortage of internal fi nancial resources. As a consequence, the 
political opposition and the civil society activists were able to organize popular movements or propose 
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parliamentary motions that proved that despite its crude repression, the regime was not as powerful as 
it claimed. Burkina Faso social mobilization against Blaise Compaoré looks the shared reference of all 
opponents, even though few still dream that politico-military organizations (and remnants of the 2000s 
armed opposition) might eventually be a triggering factor in reforming or changing the current regime 
in N’Djamena.
In January 2013, President Idriss Déby Itno sent troops to fi ght alongside French soldiers in northern Mali, 
despite the fact that Chad was not an ECOWAS (Economic Community of West Africa States) member. This 
contrasted with the procrastination of most West African states (at the notable exception of Niger). Over 
1,100 Chadian troops are still parts of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali 
(MINUSMA) mid-2015. Furthermore, far from adopting the usual peacekeeping indolence, those troops 
have been in the forefront against Islamic militant networks. Nearly two years after this fi rst projection 
of forces beyond Chadian borders, just before an AU summit in Addis-Ababa that had to debate Boko 
Haram threat late January 2015, Idriss Déby launched an offensive alongside Cameroonian and Nigerien 
forces against Boko Haram.
These political choices have rewarded Idriss Déby with increased Western diplomatic support to negotiate 
with the International Monetary Fund a reduction of Chad’s debt and ease current economic tensions. 
They also made Idriss Déby re-election in 2016 the likeliest in the presidential contest: none of his Western 
allies would have been happy with him quitting the job at a time a so-called “Jihadi crisis” is unfolding 
in the Greater Sahel. Yet, these successes also mean growing pressures on his regime. The population, 
supportive of his attitude against Islamic militant groups, suffers from his extremely poor governance 
and the systemic embezzlement of state money. Rivalries and tensions between different segments of the 
military are likely going to grow with time due to the relatively high number of casualties in the various 
fronts and also to the reduction of funds to be shared. Last but not least, terror attacks may fragment 
popular support for this policy. 
This paper analyses three major issues. First, it describes the dynamic of events that convinced (at least 
partially) Idriss Déby Itno to play victoriously the card of the West’s main regional ally against terrorism 
in the Greater Sahel Region. These reasons are rooted in his management of national tensions as well as a 
certain understanding of regional dynamics. Although he won against his own rebels in 2008, managing 
his victory became costly. The rentier transformation of the Chadian state helped to reward his supporters 
though greed dramatically increased. Paradoxically at a time there was more money to sustain patronage 
networks, the social constituency of the regime was narrowing. The growing marginalization of the 
bulk population makes more credible the scenario of economic grievances feeding (not even politically 
motivated) riots against the regime, as witnessed over the last two years.  
A second section of the text reviews Chad relationships with its neighbors. Idriss Déby Itno inherited 
complex and sometimes tumultuous relations with them. Throughout his 25 years in power, he has also 
contributed to shape those relations. This description also underlines the importance of the 2011 Libyan 
crisis on the whole region. Data were collected through interviews in the region from April 2015 to summer 
2016, though fi eldwork in CAR, Cameroon and Chad took place at several moments in that period.1 
The conclusive section proposes a comparative explanation of how and why Chad could pretend to play 
the role of a regional military power, even though it cannot be a regional hegemon. Chad is not the fi rst 
to try to haul up to this status. Others did on the continent and a comparison with Uganda would prove 
very useful to emphasize the strengths and weaknesses of Idriss Déby in that attempt. 
1 Fieldwork was possible thanks to the support of Sciences Po (Paris) and generous research funding by the Comité Catholique contre 
la Faim and the Nordic International Foundation. The author is the sole responsible for this analysis.
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GETTING RENTIER: CHAD IN THE 2000s
The Chadian regime in 2016 is very different from what it was in the early 1990s or even in the 2000s. 
The ruling party, the Salvation Patriotic Movement/Mouvement patriotique de salut (MPS), that was built in 
exile in 1989 after a failed coup against Hissène Habré was a coalition of different armed groups and after 
1990 represented a large spectrum of ethnic groups. Beyond his own ethnic group (Bideyat a sub-section 
of Zaghawa),2 he was joined by Gorane, a large section of the Arab community and other groups from the 
south and center (Sara, Hadjaraï, etc.), the three fi rst being over-represented in the security apparatus 
and being the backbone of his military apparatus. Although there is no ethnic census, a conservative 
estimate of the demography underlines how socially marginal the Bideyat and the more numerous 
Gorane are. Maybe because of this sociological feature, the MPS did not genuinely endorse multi-party 
politics. Elections were most often rigged, even at the parliamentary level; freedom of association and 
expression was constrained by an omnipotent security apparatus and the rule of law was enforced in 
a whimsical manner. International pressures at different moments were necessary to obtain slow and 
fragile improvements in economic and political governance.
This picture changed in the 2000s due to the conjunction of three different dynamics. In order to contain 
international criticisms and build confi dence with donors, the state apparatus improved its behavior and, 
after the electoral fraud in 2001 appeared too big to be denied, Idriss Déby announced that he would stick 
to the Constitution and leave the presidency at the end of his second mandate in 2006. Yet, promises only 
commit those who believe in them. 
Darfur was not a quiet region in the 1980s. Idriss Déby in 1989 was indirectly involved in an episode of 
war in Darfur. New incidents happened there in the 1990s, though they had little impact on Chad (and 
even on the political situation in Khartoum). But, the confl ict in Darfur that started in 2002/2003 was a 
very different confrontation and its regional implications were deeply felt in Chad. 
Last but not least, Chad after a lot of efforts was able to start its oil exploitation in 2003. Although Idriss 
Déby was prisoner of a number of agreements with the World Bank and oil companies, he quickly contested 
those deals to have freer hand in managing Chad oil revenues. This was possible thanks to Paris support 
since Idriss Déby was facing a growing armed opposition backed by Khartoum. Even though that money 
was fi rst spent on reinforcing the military capabilities of the regime, it also reshaped the working of the 
state apparatus and the relations between the population and the regime: oil exploitation was transforming 
Chad into a rentier state. 
A decade later, Idriss Déby’s regime looks like an old family kingdom as his sons, brothers, and (Hinda) 
in-laws have been appointed in state positions that give them access to wealth, power and coercion. The 
three highest positions in the Presidential Guard (called DGSSIE)3 are fi lled by one of his sons and two 
nephews. The DGSSIE is nowadays more numerous and better equipped than the Army which is also 
controlled by close relatives. Recruits belong to ethnic groups that represent a small proportion of the 
population but identify their interests with Déby’s: Zaghawa, Gorane and Arab (the two latter often due 
to their technical expertise and much less represented than the former though they are more numerous 
in the whole population) and few individuals from other groups. 
2 Zaghawa encompasses people from Sudan and Chad (who are called Bideyat). In this piece, “Zaghawa” is often used because many 
Sudanese Zaghawa settled in Chad after December 1990 and played a role in Idriss Déby regime. Yet, one should not downplay 
differences between Sudanese Zaghawa and Bideyat. As indicated later on, contradictions among Bideyat played a crucial role in the 
regime crisis throughout the 2000s. On these important nuances, see the work of Marie-José Tubiana on anthropological aspects. 
3 DGSSIE: Direction générale des services de sécurité des institutions de l’Etat.
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As a result, Chad despite huge amounts of oil revenues is still described as one of the poorest countries 
of the African continent. Chad sits at 154 out of 174 on Transparency International Corruption Perception 
Index. Chad also ranks 184 out of 187 countries on the 2014 UN Human Development Index.4 Daily life for 
most Chadians remains extremely diffi cult as the wealth has been accumulated by a very narrow group 
of relatives and clients of the presidential couple. 
The succession crisis
In 2001, Idriss Déby got re-elected President but the electoral fraud was too visible and France attitude 
not lenient. He announced5 that this mandate would be his last one and he wanted to prepare a smooth 
transition to a new President. Yet, parliamentary elections in 2002 were not virtuous,6 which already 
was a clear indication that Idriss Déby doubted his own promise. The French Prime Minister (1997-2002), 
Lionel Jospin, had made any conciliatory move towards Idriss Déby conditional on better policies in Chad. 
When Prime Minister Jospin lost the fi rst round of the Presidential elections in April 2002, Idriss Déby 
knew that his relation with Paris would get quickly warmer. 
In 2003, several clues showed that Idriss Déby was not anymore willing to keep his words about respecting 
the Constitution, had he been once sincere about it. He got involved in regime change in CAR in March 
and he knew that events in Bangui would require him to continue to act decisively in Bangui (which he 
did until summer 2004).7 Oil exploitation that had needed so many compromises with the Bretton Woods 
institutions in the late 1990s got started and the fl ow of money after many years of budgetary diet was 
too rewarding to be left to others. Many among his closest supporters were nervous about keeping their 
wealth and properties if he gave up power in N’Djamena: Idriss Déby as President was seen as a guarantee 
of the continued impunity for those barons (at a scale that today appears minor). 
Unsurprisingly, at the MPS Congress in autumn 2003, those latter enthusiastically proposed to amend 
the Constitution to allow Idriss Déby to get an unlimited number of mandates, a proposal he endorsed. 
This decision was far from consensual among those who had backed Déby for years as illustrated by the 
resignation of the Chad Ambassador to Washington, Ahmed Hassaballah Soubiane (a MPS heavyweight), 
and the absence of the two Erdimi brothers at the Congress.8 Some among Déby’s associates expected to 
compete for the presidential position. Others, like Tom and Timan Erdimi who eventually led the armed 
opposition against Déby two years later, were concerned that the opposition would grow to a point that the 
regime and Bideyat be threatened. The Erdimi brothers were advocating a smooth transition at the cost 
of losing the presidential position. The political opposition was mobilized against possible constitutional 
changes as it knew that the MPS without Idriss Déby as President would split in many smaller parties 
and be easier to defeat. Some – yet weak and not numerous – found that this was the proof nothing would 
change without violence and used the war situation in Darfur to get sanctuaries. 
In 2004, the Constitution was changed through a referendum that was seen by many as a scam. A 
coup attempt also failed and proved that some in the regime inner circle refused to endorse once 
more Idriss Déby’s taste for power. Late 2005, new armed groups emerged and announced that they 
intended to overthrow Idris Déby. Many offi cers in the military or the then Presidential Guard left to 
4 See for instance p. 4 at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/228170.pdf
5 “Idriss Déby: “Il me reste à préparer le Tchad à l’alternance”, Le Monde, 5 June 2001.
6 The ruling party, the MPS, got 113 seats/155, enough to change the Constitution without looking for allies. See http://www.ipu.
org/parline-f/reports/arc/1061_02.htm 
7 Roland Marchal, “Aux marges du monde… en Afrique centrale”, Les Etudes du CERI, n° 153-154, March 2009, available at http://
www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/etude153_154.pdf 
8 Tom and Timan Erdimi were instrumental in building the MPS and appointing key ministers and high-ranking civil servants 
in the 1990s. 
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join the opposition: not only hardcore opponents such as Tama or Waddaï people but Zaghawa cadres 
who sometimes had helped building the regime they suddenly wanted to fi ght. 
This armed opposition was never united, beyond overthrowing Idriss Déby. It was a constellation of 
groups with different political backgrounds. Some represented an old opposition to the regime based on 
confrontations that took place in the 1990s. Others joined because they got an opportunity through the 
Darfur confl ict to have sanctuaries and weapons. Those who eventually led this loose federation were from 
the inner circle of Idriss Déby. These groups were allied as much as competitors and failed to win not only 
because Idriss Déby got strong French backing but also because in key moments they preferred to lose the 
battle than to offer the victory to one of them. The N’Djamena battle early February 2008 was the perfect 
illustration of those divisions: armed groups were able to enter N’Djamena but split there on who should 
be named Interim President; a support contingent left Darfur with fuel and ammunitions as the battle 
in N’Djamena was longer than expected but preferred to get lost and keep those goods for the next step. 
Second, these armed groups were made up of Chadian people. This may sound obvious but it is not. 
France pretended that these movements were made up of mostly mercenaries paid for by Khartoum to 
Islamize and Arabize Chad in order to justify its support to a debatable regime. Khartoum was seen as 
capable to do that and therefore no one in the international community dared to challenge Paris views. 
The Sudanese Security Services were split on whom to help more than others and this provoked several 
artifi cial crises among the Chadian armed opposition groups. The most striking aspect was that these 
armed movements never had a signifi cant South Chadian membership not because Southerners were 
supportive of Déby (some indeed were) but because Christians were seen suspiciously by Khartoum. This 
lack proved once more how the armed groups represented more a continuing rivalry among “northern” 
groups to share power than a truly national political coalition to achieve an agenda of democratization. 
The civilian opposition tried to not associate itself with these armed groups but also felt that these 
latter were the only actors able to trigger changes. This ambiguity was genuine and became very costly 
since the main opposition fi gure, Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh, was kidnapped by Idriss Déby bodyguards 
and allegedly killed hours after the defeat of the offensive against N’Djamena early February 2008.9 To a 
large extent, the civilian political organizations were the greatest losers of this period: the kidnapping of 
some of their leaders, whether they survived or not, meant that Idriss Déby would stay as the undisputed 
leader able to punish radical opponents. An EU guaranteed political agreement between the opposition 
political parties and the MPS signed in August 2007 to get free and fair elections in 2011 just proved naïve 
and a face saving step to Idriss Déby. When elections took place, the most important opposition leaders 
(all were from the south) were elected but the MPS got seats enough to change the Constitution (117 seats 
to the MPS and 14 to political allies on a total of 188 seats).10 
But victory could be paradoxical. Today as yesterday, no one is able to say what would happen in Chad 
if tomorrow Idriss Déby passes away. Whatever the Constitution states, tensions within the security 
apparatus and the ruling elites would likely be very disruptive, even destructive. 
The regional implications of the war in Darfur
Idriss Déby’s political longevity has also been linked to his mastering of relations with Khartoum. 
Throughout the Chadian civil war, Darfur was the primary sanctuary of armed groups willing to overthrow 
the regime in N’Djamena: the Frolinat was set up in Nyala, Hissène Habré and Idriss Déby made Western 
Sudan a base to take power in N’Djamena. 
9 https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/Rapportcommissiondenquete.pdf
10 http://www.ipu.org/parline-f/reports/1061.htm
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Déby’s victory in December 1990 was due to a fragile but enduring de facto alliance (or connivance at least) 
between the new Islamist regime in Khartoum, Qaddafi ’s Libya and François Mitterrand’s France. Members 
of the ruling military junta in Khartoum were supporting Déby for Zaghawa politics. Khartoum wanted 
to deprive Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army of facilities in Chad and to cultivate good relations 
with Paris. Qaddafi  was concerned by plans made by the US and Hissène Habré to set up a Libyan guerilla 
movement led by the nowadays better known General Khalifa Belqassin Haftar.11 François Mitterrand 
thought that Hissène Habré was becoming a liability because of his record of human rights violations, the 
growing US infl uence on him and his resistance to any accommodation with Paris on several important 
issues (including the status of Epervier Operation). 
Idriss Déby operated without Sudanese constraints and received huge consignments of weapons and 
ammunitions from Libya. Moreover, Qaddafi  pressured remnants of other Chadian rebel groups to join 
him against Hissène Habré. Sudanese Zaghawa also joined Idriss Déby and fought against Hissène Habré: 
beyond ethnic solidarity, they expected to be integrated in the new Chadian army. Their number was 
such that Paris in the early 1990s pushed hard to send them back to Sudan: too many NCOs and offi cers 
were unable to speak or understand French and Paris was concerned that Islamists were also infi ltrated 
among them. Among those who stayed in Chad, many got involved in the Darfur confl ict in the 2000s, 
even though they kept their Chadian uniform.12 
The Darfur confl ict reshaped regional political alliances.13 Qaddafi  had scores to settle with Khartoum 
after he had escaped death in an 1996 ambush planned by Libyan Islamists who were refugees in Sudan. 
Many of his Islamist opponents were indeed hosted by Khartoum by then (and went back to Libya only 
in 2011). Arming Darfur insurgents through Chad became one way of undermining the Sudanese regime. 
In Chad, due to the transnational shared identities (especially among Zaghawa) and family connections, 
particularly between the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) leaders and Idriss Déby extended family, 
the neutrality claimed by Idriss Déby evaporated as the crisis was unfolding in Darfur. 
At fi rst, Idriss Déby was not willing to support the Darfur rebellions because this endangered his good 
relations with Omar al-Bashir and also because those rebellions somewhat challenged his authority among 
Zaghawa people. But this stance became impossible at a time his Chad-grounded armed opposition was 
taking shape. Opportunistic alliances between Darfur and Chad rebels could have been built and would 
have altered the balance of forces in N’Djamena. Two years after the beginning of the confl ict in Darfur, 
in July 2005, Idriss Déby crossed the red line and changed the de facto informal support into a more offi cial 
endorsement of the Darfur insurgents beyond the diplomatic niceties that were still exchanged between 
the two capital cities. 
Between autumn 2005 and summer 2009, the Darfur conflict and the succession crisis in Chad 
became deeply connected due to regional alignments and Zaghawa power struggle both in Chad 
and Sudan. After several years of open confrontation, N’Djamena and Khartoum came to terms 
that its continuation would have negative effect on the survival of both regimes.14 It was smarter to 
de-escalate and define the rules of a new coexistence. This was done in the second semester 2009 and 
was illustrated by important events on each side. JEM leader was not anymore authorized to stay in 
Chad and was eventually killed in an air strike while the Sudanese Intelligence Chief, Abdallah Gosh, 
who had been the strongest supporter of destabilizing Chad, was dismissed. 
11 http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20141020171033/
12 El-Fasher Airport was taken in April 2003 by a group of Darfur insurgents dressed in Chadian military fatigues. The collusion 
between Chadian soldiers and Darfur insurgents was so clear that increasingly Khartoum questioned its trust in Idriss Déby.
13 Roland Marchal, “Chad/Darfur: How two crises merge”, Review of African Political Economy, vol. 33, n° 109, September 2006, pp. 457-482.
14 Jérôme Tubiana, Renouncing the Rebels: Local and Regional Implications of the Chad Sudan Rapprochement, Small Arms Survey, 2011, 
available at http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-25-Local-and-Regional-Dimensions-
Chad-Sudan-Rapprochement.pdf
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From that period on, both regimes have cooperated to secure their interests in the border area. Chad 
intervenes inside Darfur against armed groups opposed to Khartoum and tries to split them, if not defeat 
them. Chad, Sudan and CAR have joined efforts to build a joint military force which mandate is to secure 
the three border area.
The rentier curse
Oil exploitation drastically changed the demeanor of the Chadian state but this transformation was 
not immediately visible because, over the fi rst years, oil revenues were mostly allocated to the military 
budget. Military expenditures of Chad surged by 663 percent, between 2000 and 2009.15 Only after 2009, 
oil revenues started being spent on other sectors. 
The confrontation with its internal opposition was won by Idriss Déby but the cost of that victory was 
high. Rebellion is a way of life in Chad16 and many Déby supporters could not understand why their 
President was unwilling to accommodate his armed opposition the same way he had done it in the 1990s. 
Moreover, because the Bideyat are not numerous in Chad (maybe about 2-3% of the population), casualties 
have always been taken seriously because they could alter the balance of forces not only among Bideyat 
or Zaghawa sub-clans but also between Bideyat and other groups such as Gorane or Arabs. 
As a matter of fact, the fi ghting throughout 2005 and 2009 took many Zaghawa and Bideyat lives, especially 
in February 2008 at Massaguet (90 km far from the capital city). In order to repair the damages within 
his extended family and Zaghawa at large, Idriss Déby after his victory needed to reward or compensate 
his parents and appointed them in the state apparatus. To a large extent, he won the war making clear 
that if he were overthrown the Zaghawa would lose power and now that victory was reached his regime 
had to be their regime.17 
To understand the magnitude of this shift, one should compare this new stance with his own attitude 
in the early 2000s when he was careful not to give the impression that he was giving free rein to his own 
family at least as far as the state apparatus was concerned (many of his relatives were already conducing 
trade and business without caring much about taxation and regulation). 
This “family-zation” – to say it this strange way – became particularly manifest in the way recruitment 
in the security apparatus was carried out. In 2010, to prove Paris his good will, he undertook a further 
reform of the security sector. He dismissed many old generals and colonels (by then Chad’s military looked 
Mexican with more than 60 generals) and requested them to quit villas owned by the State. Army units 
were also rebuilt and gave chance to more national inclusiveness. Yet, a closer glance over a longer period 
shows that fi nancial rewards to leave the military were very generous, and more problematically many 
were recruited back after January 2013 when military adventures restarted in Mali and CAR. From 2013 
onwards, new recruits became employed in the Presidential Guard or the Army but many (if not most) of 
those who were Zaghawa and Gorane joined the former while others had more chance to join the latter. 
15 Lena Guesnet, “Oil, conflict and military expenditure: The Chad example”, Stockholm, SIPRI, 2013, available at http://www.
sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/ICES2013/papers/archive/guesnet-oil-conflict-military-expenditure-chad and Gilbert 
Maoudonodji, Les enjeux géopolitiques de l’exploitation du pétrole au Tchad, Université catholique de Louvain, Presses de l’Université 
catholique de Louvain, January 2009.
16 Marielle Debos, Le métier des armes au Tchad. Le gouvernement de l’entre-deux guerres, Paris, Karthala, 2013. See also the updated 
English translation, Living by the Gun in Chad. Combatants, Impunity and State Formation, London, Zed Press, 2016. 
17 In 2006, when defections were multiplying in his entourage, Idriss Déby changed his official name to make it Idriss Déby Itno. 
Everyone knew that he was indeed the grand-son of Itno but mentioning it again was a way to remind all descendants and relatives 
of Itno that he was one of them and should benefit from their protection as much as he had to help them. 
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This patronage policy went beyond the state apparatus.18 In Chad, the State provides the private sector 
with generous contracts. Many clients of the regime became richer overnight because they set up paper 
companies that were given contracts they had no skills to undertake. The options were to either take a 
generous commission and sub-contract a more capable fi rm, or grab the whole payment knowing that 
informal bargaining with people at the presidency could avoid problems with the judicial system. Anyway, 
being imprisoned for embezzlement of state money has not been a major issue after 2009 since people are 
released without any further legal actions after a few weeks or months. 
Idriss Déby drew lessons from the 2000s crisis and secured his position within his own ethnic group by 
employing the youth and providing economic opportunities through the State or the private sector to many 
others. Gorane, who could be the most dangerous contenders, also benefi ted from the same advantages.19 
Furthermore, the rentier State allowed Idriss Déby to act in a very different fi eld: reshaping Bideyat 
customary authority. His Kolyala sub-clan, during the colonial period, got once the chieftainship of the 
Bideyat but lost it. At one point mostly to take revenge from more “aristocratic” sub-clans such as Kobé, 
he imposed his brother, Timan, as a traditional chief. This “coup de force” was met by sarcasms. This 
had no much implication until the war started in Darfur. Timan Déby was related to Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, 
charismatic JEM leader while Daoussa (Idriss elder brother) was also a strong supporter of Zaghawa leaders 
of the Darfur insurgency. The President had to clarify his stance after reconciling with Khartoum. While 
Daoussa faced one further (but short) moment of disgrace, it became necessary to remove Timan Déby 
from that position to curb suspicion among Sudanese securocrats. This decision was also applauded by 
Bideyat since they were very reluctant to pay Timan Déby customary duties for parochial reasons. 
However, Idriss Déby had no other alternative than becoming himself the new traditional chief: again, 
this move was mocked by many Bideyat for customary or more political reasons. His current policy 
(that requires money) is to appoint many junior chiefs who basically can only exist if they contest the 
traditional (older) hierarchy. By doing so, Idriss Déby settles score with more aristocratic families who 
at one point were inclined to support his opposition and also makes sure that no one would have moral 
authority strong enough to contest him in the social arena. However, he cannot revenge without any 
risk: hot-tempered Bideyat feel humiliated and claim that they are going to join opposition parties even 
if those latter are led by Southerners (but Muslims).20 
All those mechanisms to build and sustain patronage networks are eventually based on oil revenues. 
Despite recurrent arguments with oil companies and a very lax spending of oil revenues, this could have 
gone ahead for years but the collapse of the international oil price late 2014 meant that Chad ruler would 
not have the same freedom. Chad budget for 2015 was cut twice because of unrealistic forecasts on oil 
price and payments of salaries for the civil service were substantially delayed.21 The situation deteriorated 
further: 2016 budget was even worse.
In 2015 and 2016, in several occasions the police decided to shut on demonstrators either to save colleagues 
or because they could not control the rioting populace. When the sons and daughters of the ruling elite 
share a cozy life, most children and teenagers of the same age see their existence poisoned by scarcities, 
bad education and low expectations. What has been very striking in the demonstrations was not police 
violence but youth who behaved as if they had nothing to lose anymore and were provoking the police 
18 Géraud Magrin, Voyage en Afrique rentière. Une lecture géographique des trajectoires de développement, Paris, Publications de la 
Sorbonne, 2013.
19 Roland Marchal, “Le Tchad entre deux guerres ? Remarques sur un présumé complot”, Politique africaine, n° 130, June 2013, pp.213-223.
20 This also raises another aspect not discussed here. Over his rule, Idriss Déby never accepted any competition from other 
Northerners. Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh was a likely powerful competitor and he “disappeared” in February 2008. Southerners 
can join the opposition because they are not seen as potentially dangerous for his regime.
21 See for further details http://www.gramp-chad.org/index.php/fr/ and also Africa Confidential, “Winning battles, losing wars”, 
Africa Confidential, vol. 56, n° 10, 15 May 2015.
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forces. Civil society organizations and political parties in Chad look very carefully at political dynamics 
in Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi: at least change may happen…
It is in such a context that one should analyze the emergence of Chad as a military power in the Sahel.  
CHAD THROUGH ITS FRONTIERS
This section provides an overview of security threats encountered by Chad with its neighbors. The 
diffi culty is often that informal relations are more structural than offi cial ones but are not well-known.22 
The nature of the threat also creates additional shortcomings in the sense that few writers deconstruct 
certain situations. For instance, is Boko Haram in northern Cameroon exactly the same movement as in 
Borno state inside Nigeria? 
The main strength of Chad is that, for the time being Boko Haram and other Jihadi groups are kept at its 
borders and not really present at the grassroots level, despite several bloody terror attacks in N’Djamena 
and the Lake region. This is not to say that Chadian society is unscathed from radical tendencies but these 
latter are not assertive enough to challenge the state. For years, certain ethnic groups that often had had 
durable business relations with Gulf societies developed forms of Wahhabism and Salafi sm: among them, 
Boulala and Kreda are the more numerous. 
Outside observers (such as this author) often pay more attention to this form of religious changes because 
they are boosted by globalization than other forms that are deeply rooted in local histories of parochial 
confl icts and temporary migrations over the border for education purposes. The Boudouma, today the 
strongest Chadian supporters of Boko Haram, belong to this latter category. They are not Jihadi per se but 
obediently follow their sheikhs who have increasingly been polarized by events in north-eastern Nigeria. 
Land issues, ethnic solidarity, religious elites and the lack of any decent state presence, can identify them 
as potential Boko Haram supporters…. 
Paradoxically, Chad’s military strength may provide an incentive for militant groups to fi nd popular 
support in Chad. As Somalia case proves, Islamist radical movements try to reinvent themselves as 
transnational entities that could strike troop-contributing countries. Today, one can see the premises 
of that situation in Niger and Cameroon. Yet, one cannot conclude directly that this is going to happen 
soon in Chad, despite bloody attacks in N’Djamena. 
N’Djamena may feel safer on its border with Sudan and CAR but the duration of the confl icts in these 
two countries may produce destabilizing effects in Chad, even though they likely won’t take the shape 
of Islamist armed groups. What is missing is a clear strategy of regional states and the international 
community to fi nd an acceptable solution for all. States should not be the only ones to be blamed for this 
bloody stalemate. The Darfur insurgent movements as well as the uncompromising attitude of Khartoum 
exhausted the good will of many international mediation teams. CAR Seleka and anti-balaka groups have 
no more any real chain of command and never proved politically accountable.
Currently the international headlines are on Boko Haram though it is increasingly obvious that this 
problem is not going to be solved soon. However, one should be concerned by events in south and south-
west Libya because the crystallizing elements of the next crisis are there. The pending question is whether 
the two crises may eventually connect with dire consequences for the whole Sahel. 
22 Janet Roitman, Fiscal Disobedience: An Anthropology of Economic Regulation in Central Africa, New York, Princeton University Press, 2005.
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A long and unsuccessful intervention in Central African Republic
Chad was instrumental in organizing the coup that overthrew Ange-Felix Patassé in March 2003. It was 
organized by regional states and endorsed by Paris. Ange-Felix Patassé was a whimsical President who 
destroyed what was left from the CAR State after three decades of dictatorship. The CAR President also 
entertained unconventional alliances, especially with Muammar Qaddafi , Chadian rebels and Jean-Pierre 
Bemba, who were not seen favorably by Paris, to say the least. The new incumbent, General François 
Bozizé, was not a strong character and Idriss Déby thought he could not only be the kingmaker but also 
stay as the mentor of the new regime. When François Bozizé questioned this status from 2009 onwards, 
relations between the two heads of State started deteriorating. 
The links between the two countries were not only political: there were signifi cant economic interests in 
general trade, transportation, livestock and diamond. Chadian military contingents were the backbone of 
successive regional forces which mandate was to consolidate peace and security in CAR, while helping to 
demobilize armed groups: FOMUC (2002-2008), MICOPAX (2008-2013), MISCA (2013-2014). As corroborated 
by the launch of Operation Sangaris on 5th December 2013, all those regional operations failed to deliver.
When the Seleka (a loose coordination of Muslim armed groups) was able to get close to Bangui in December 
2012 and obtained a power sharing agreement signed in Libreville with François Bozizé in January 2013, many 
observers thought that Idriss Déby had made a point since that movement would not have existed without 
Chadian (unoffi cial) backing. When the Libreville agreement collapsed and the Seleka took over Bangui late 
March 2013, experts thought that history was repeating itself and that the new President, Michel Djotodia, 
would act as a spokesperson of Idriss Déby.
This did not happen. Although apparently united behind Michel Djotodia, Seleka contingents were looting and 
killing endlessly. While in 2003 and 2004, the Chadian military present in CAR had intervened several times to 
contain the predation of the “libérateurs” (i.e. the Chadian mercenaries who were the real striking force behind 
François Bozizé), in 2013 it stayed idle. One likely explanation was that many Seleka mid-level commanders 
were actually Chadians, either people who had rebelled against Déby in the 2000s and stayed in Darfur where 
they had been recruited by Seleka leaders or fi ghters who had reconciled with Idriss Déby’s regime and were 
demobilized in Chad but left out and ready for a new well-paid military adventure (many were promised 15 FCFA 
millions #25,000 US dollars).23 Few others had been involved in Khartoum funded militias that fi rst fought the 
insurgents in Darfur and then became highway bandits and community vigilantes.
The situation in CAR deteriorated quickly without any regional or international reaction. When in June 
2013, major international NGOs called for an international action to stop the population predicament, 
neither Paris, nor Washington, nor New York reacted. Regional capital cities kept silent as well. In 
summer 2013, a constellation of vigilante groups, the anti-balaka, emerged in the center north of the 
country and recruited at fi rst among François Bozizé ethnic group (Gbaya) and, later on, among the 
Christian community that represents about 85% of the population. Although there was not any religious 
argument per se, the population perceived the Seleka as made up of Muslims (mostly Chadians) and 
this perception contributed to make the confl ict communal. The anti-balaka carried out numerous 
mass killings of Peulh/Fulani/Mbororo pastoralists, small traders, shopkeepers and other Muslims. 
The spiraling violence orchestrated by the two groups created havoc. 
In December 2013, France intervened and immediately got MICOPAX backing. Soon after, Chad contingent 
was accused to side Muslims and Seleka. In April 2014, after several bloody incidents Chadian soldiers who were 
attacked by hand grenade responded by shooting civilians in front of UN witnesses. The new Interim President, 
Catherine Samba-Panza, publicly criticized Chad. Furious, Idriss Déby called back his troops and closed the border…
23 Interviews with Seleka officers, Bangui, May 2013.
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The situation became dysfunctional, if not dangerous. Economically, pastoralists are stuck in Chad 
Salamat region as the border is offi cially closed. The support (or laissez-faire) of Idriss Déby to Seleka 
factions is partly aimed at building protection for the pastoralists to access grazing land in CAR. While the 
economy should have been a reconciling tool, it is bringing more militarization. Politically, it is unclear 
what Idriss Déby wants to achieve. Does he pretend to be again a kingmaker in CAR and use the Seleka as 
a dangerous tool to prove how necessary he is (“Myself or the chaos?”)? Does he want to protect a Muslim 
community that suffered much because of its perceived association with him? Does he just want to use 
CAR as a playing ground to confront the remnants of his armed opposition from the 2000s? 
The Seleka has split in several contending groups and if there were any chain of command before, it has 
disappeared. At this stage, it is unable to destabilize southern Chad but many small groups of highway bandits 
operate nowadays at its periphery. This is why the continuation of the crisis in CAR is dangerous for Chad. 
Instability (whether purely criminal or politically tinted) can eventually spill over the border. 
The anti-balaka/Seleka religious reading can have some echo in South Chad, even though the issue of 
citizenship that is at the core of the CAR crisis does not make sense in Chad. Relations between Christians 
and Muslims in Chad are much more different than in CAR because Islam is better represented and is 
practiced in the north, center and south of the country even though its demographic importance is not 
the same everywhere. 
Dealing with Boko Haram 
Chad was not immune from the Boko Haram confl ict. Many Nigerians (including members of this 
Islamist organization) sheltered in Chad. This was a concern for security services even though up to 
2014 no terrorist action was undertaken inside Chad. But late 2014, there were signs that a surge of 
military activities near the Chadian borders would end up inside Chad: weapon consignments were 
confi scated in Kousseri, a Cameroonian border city; armed incidents happened on Lake Chad’s small 
islands. Boko Haram had to reinvent itself as in mid-2013 it had decided to reinforce its presence in 
the countryside since the Nigerian army and police were getting more assertive in cities. The regional 
intervention became certainly a further incentive for this movement to get regionalized and claim a 
global Jihadi affi liation (to ISIL). 
Maybe more by osmosis than a plan, Boko Haram got supporters in Lake Chad islands. This area is one of 
the poorest in Chad, certainly one where the state has been mostly absent for decades. The livelihood is 
rustic, organized through farming and small pilgrimages to local sheikhs’ tombs. As the border between 
Chad and Nigeria is not demarcated, people move indiscriminately from one side to the other. Support to 
Boko Haram seems mostly ethnically grounded. Chad also had a tradition to get children sent to Quranic 
schools in north-eastern Nigeria. Because of the confl ict, many were expelled back to Chad but there is 
no (offi cial) indication that some of these al-majiri (Quranic students) are Boko Haram followers. 
In October 2014, Idriss Déby tried to facilitate a dialogue between people close to Abukar Shekau, Boko Haram 
leader, and President Jonathan’s representatives: a new meeting should have been convened in December 
2014, had the two sides implemented the confi dence measures they had agreed upon. Nothing happened (on 
both sides) and Idriss Déby was right to believe that time for a greater confrontation had come.24 
Goodluck Jonathan underplayed the seriousness of Boko Haram for years. The Nigerian Army’s 
performance by all accounts had indeed been poor, with reports of mutinies, blatant corruption, and 
gross underfunding, despite a national security budget in the range of 5-6 billion US dollars. The military 
and the police often did not respect the population they were supposed to protect from Boko Haram: as 
24 Interviews, N’Djamena, April 2015
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illustrated in many incidents, they became the best recruiting agent for the militant organization because 
of immense collateral damages or simply because they fl ew the places without any fi ght. This sheds light 
on why Goodluck Jonathan contracted mercenaries who happened to not have played a purely technical 
role but were most often on the frontline.25 
While observers believe that Chad was rewarded by President Jonathan for its military intervention, Idriss 
Déby also acted because of proper Chadian concerns: not just for money or because of the security threat 
in Chad. Chad depends for most of its imports from two important trading roads: one brings goods from 
Cotonou and Lagos through Maiduguri to N’Djamena; the other one supplies Chad from Douala. In both 
cases, traffi c was hampered by insecurity, largely due to Boko Haram to the extent that transportation 
prices grew up and commodities in N’Djamena and other Chadian cities became more expensive. Due to 
the economic diffi culties in Chad, the social climate was too tense to take a risk. Chad has also been trading 
livestock to Borno state and the insecurity froze this activity, in which many high-ranking military offi cers 
are involved. Intervening against Boko Haram was not simply decided because of ideological differences…
In Cameroon, Boko Haram had been able to build a constituency. Even if the Sambisa Forest (one of 
Boko Haram main sanctuaries) is lost by the militant organization, local support won’t evaporate. The 
reasons are based on history and have much communality with what has been described earlier about the 
Boudouma: the area is very underdeveloped and President Biya never tried to gain the population. This 
lack of interest is somewhat explained by the 1984 attempt coup organized by offi cers from that region. 
Those events had also strong consequences on the working of the Cameroonian military. Although defense 
is the third most important in the national budget, the army is not operational. High offi cers are most 
often prosperous businessmen who own hotels, commercial farms, private security companies and even 
nightclubs.26 In contrast, the regime created special units. After the “Commandement opérationnel” set up in 
2000 to fi ght thug gangs in Douala and, allegedly, responsible for the disappearance and extra-judiciary 
killing of above 1,500 people, the “Bataillon d’intervention rapide” (BIR) was established to fi ght highway 
banditry in the north and east of the country. From 2009 onwards, its role evolved and replaced the military 
to secure the Bakassi Peninsula.27 Incidentally, this border incident explains why relations between Abuja 
and Yaoundé had been cold up to the visit of the newly elected Nigerian President to Yaoundé in June 
2015. Even when fi ghting Boko Haram, Cameroon BIR was not allowed to cross the border into Nigeria. 
In Cameroon, Chad is often perceived as a French stooge and Biya’s regime is nearly paranoid when 
France comes into the picture. France is accused of having supported the 1984 failed coup and promoted 
from time to time politicians who wanted to replace Paul Biya. France is recurrently accused to support 
Boko Haram (no less than that) in order to send French troops occupy Cameroon (while the USA would 
do the same in Nigeria). Chad is seen as part of this new conspiracy. Of course, diplomatically discourses 
are more politically correct but media close to the regime agitate this mistrustful version of events. 
There are less paranoid motivations as well to explain the chilliness between N’Djamena and Yaoundé. 
The latter is convinced that, over the last two decades, most of the insecurity in the north was linked to 
“coupeurs de route” (highway bandits) who belonged or were connected to Chad military.28 Chad involvement 
in the CAR crisis and the way François Bozizé lost power also provoked an outrage in Yaoundé. As a 
consequence, despite French pressures, the defeated CAR President was allowed to stay with his family 
that enjoyed a near to offi cial status in Yaoundé for months. 
25 Ed Cropley and David Lewis, “Nigeria drafts in foreign mercenaries to take on Boko Haram”, Reuters, 12 March 2015. 
26 Fanny Pigeaud, Au Cameroun de Paul Biya, Paris, Karthala, 2011. 
27 Rich in oil, the Bakassi Peninsula was also claimed by Nigeria that took it over in 1993. Following a decision by the International 
Justice Court in 2002, the Nigerian army eventually left Bakassi in 2008. 
28 Cyril Musila, Insécurité transfrontalière dans la zone CEMAC-CEEAC. Le bassin du Lac Tchad entre Cameroun-Tchad-Centrafrique et inf luences 
soudano-nigérianes, Paris, Institut français des relations internationales, November 2011. 
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The Boko Haram crisis therefore played a positive role to foster relations between the two neighbors. 
Early March 2015, the Chadian Minister of Communication announced in Yaoundé that 40% of the weapons 
that were confi scated from Boko Haram were French made: both countries could suddenly share the same 
antagonism against their former colonizer. France Embassy in Yaoundé made a diplomatic response and 
only hinted that many French weapons disappeared from Chad barracks and found their way to Borno 
state. Chadian pundits also eagerly remind that Idriss Déby Itno was in business with Ali Modu Sheriff, 
once the Maiduguri Governor and today a Senator. This latter in the 2000s supported Mohamed Yusuf, 
the founder of Boko Haram…
Chad support to Niger has to be understood in a very different context. Relationships between the two 
Presidents are amicable, a strong difference with Cameroon, CAR and Nigeria. The two countries share 
economic interests and also major concerns on the Libyan crisis. In Niger, the situation has reached a 
level when the sole military intervention is not anymore suffi cient to contain Boko Haram. The security 
deterioration started early 2014 at least and the growth of Boko Haram is not merely based on ethnic 
solidarities or commonalities: drought, demography, poverty and State’s absence (but in a different 
context than northern Cameroon) offer Boko Haram avenues to recruit young people and impose its 
understanding of Islam. 
The Boko Haram attack on Bosso village near Diffa in June 2016 raised uneasy questions about the 
behavior of Niger’s Army and the role played by Chadian soldiers in last resort. While Niger’s military was 
considered for decades a well-performing army, over the presidency of Mahamadou Issoufou, it seems to 
have weakened largely for political reasons as the Niger President has been fearing a coup attempt and 
allowed the embezzlement of military budget to buy high-ranking offi cers and political fi gures instead of 
strengthening the military by buying better equipment.29 The call to Chad to envoy troops is politically 
very sensitive, even though the Chadian contingent was able to dissipate the threat and restore some 
security for the local population. 
Dealing with many “Libyas”
Chad and Niger shared the same view on the 2011 Western intervention in Libya and its negative effects 
on the Sahel region.30 In the fi rst months of the insurgency in Libya, Muammar Qaddafi  was confi dent 
he could trust the Chadian community in his country. Quantities of weapons, military hardware and 
ammunitions were moved south to Sabha where the Tubu were indeed supportive of Qaddafi  and Déby. Late 
spring 2011, under Paris and Washington pressures, Idriss Déby had to pay lip service to the intervention 
and keep a lower profi le. 
Tubu are an ethnic group present in Chad, Libya and Niger. They have been politically associated with 
Idriss Déby who also entertains warm relations with the customary Tubu Chief, the Derdeï, and a former 
President of Chad, Goukouny Weddeye.31 The Gorane, who live on their southern edge entertain a great 
cultural proximity with the Tubu, though they adopted a very different attitude throughout the civil war.32
In Sabha region, three main groups are settled and mixed in the city more than in the countryside: 
Tuareg, Tubu and Arab. The latter community is the less numerous and powerful. It witnessed the regime 
29 Laurent Bigot, “Au Niger, l’armée affaiblie par la paranoïa de son président”, Le Monde, 10 October 2016.
30 Roland Marchal, The Reshaping of West Africa after Muammar Qaddafi’s Fall, NOREF, October 2012, available at http://www.peacebuilding.
no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/e77b4e80c8cc5f6a4c4e62a5ab1d658c.pdf
31 This support was challenged for years by Yusuf Togoïmi who set up the Mouvement pour la démocratie et la justice au Tchad. He 
died in 2002.
32 There are many sources on the connections between Southern Libya and Chad over the last decades. A very recent paper is 
Judith Scheele, “The Libyan connection: settlement, war and other entanglements in northern Chad”, Journal of African History, 
vol. 57, n° 1, 2016, pp. 115-134.
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change, tried to get its chance against suddenly “would-be Africans” but was severely beaten. Mid 2015, 
for what interviews say, Arab groups cannot be considered a strategic stakeholder despite attempts by 
Khartoum to strengthen them. 
The Tuareg are those hosting most of the Islamic militants who have escaped from Mali and settled 
around Sabha to rest and buy equipment. The system of alliances is based on tribal communalities but 
also on shared involvement in traffi cking or trade (foodstuff, people, military hardware, ammunitions). 
For the time being,33 the Tubu keep aloof up to a certain extent from these settlements and are reluctant 
to deal with those guests. Idriss Déby mobilized his clients within that tribe to gain better leverage. 
Sophisticated systems of weapons were bought and brought to Chad to avoid them to get into wrong 
hands. Money still changes hands to make sure that Tubu fi gures do not behave too opportunistically 
in front of militant Islamists. Goukouny Weddeye is travelling often in those areas since he has prestige 
among his kinsmen. This sheds light on why French military are still committed to Idriss Déby because 
what he does there is seen as strategic and nobody else could play such a role since Tubu in Niger use to 
follow their tribe on the Chadian side of the border. 
However, this is not a stable situation. Sooner or later, Jihadi fi ghters are going to develop a constituency 
among Tubu, even if minimally. The whole regional economy is based on trading activities, whether legal 
or illegal, with Niger and Mali, and there are economic incentives that may or might be used to push 
on one side or the other. Furthermore, Sabha is not cut from the region: its inhabitants are following 
developments in Chad, Niger and Mali and its population may reassess its links with other stakeholders 
present in northern Libya, in Tripoli, Tobruk or elsewhere. Opportunistic alliances may be formed for 
the sake of controlling an important trading road and gain some leverage on Mali and Niger economic or 
political operators. Eventually, trading cities such as Abéché will be affected.
Remnants of the 2005-2009 rebellion are also present in the region and, like elements of the Darfur 
insurgencies, have tried to benefi t from the need of manpower by political factions in Northern Libya. 
What is left from the Erdimi faction, for instance, is allied with the Islamist militias of Misrata, no less 
because Timan Erdimi is settled in Doha and Qatar is funding both groups. Mahamat Nouri’s remnants 
split in several factions, one being allied with General Haftar while another one is trying to develop 
connections with Nigerien dissidents.34 
International military intervention in Libya is not yet an option. In the region, neighbors are ambivalent. 
Algiers that is trying to restore its infl uence in Sahel against what it sees as Rabat’s encroachments is 
adamantly opposed to it since armed Islamists may try to fi nd refuge in Algeria. At the same time, a 
number of military newsletters are confi rming that US, Canadian and French Special forces carried out 
covert operations in south and south-west Libya. 
To conclude this sketchy description, one should also raise a last point: Sudan’s policy towards 
Libya and Chad. 
Sudan: an unlikely ally?
The reconciliation in June 2009 between N’Djamena and Khartoum meant peace at the cost of Darfur 
and Chad populations. But options were rather limited due to the kind of insurgencies both regimes were 
facing. Khartoum, at that time, had little expectation on peace in Darfur; one may even say that peace was 
not on the agenda. It wanted to end a confrontation that was becoming expensive due to Paris lobbying 
within the European Union and the international community at large. Most of the Doha Darfur Peace 
33 According to interviews in N’Djamena, March 2015.
34 Interviews with Chadian dissidents, Paris, October 2016.
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Process was an exercise to split armed groups and emphasize insurgents’ over-ambitions. Khartoum’s 
urgency was the elections of 2011 and the consequences of the establishment of South Sudan. The situation 
in Darfur was no more seen as a painful priority: the “Save Darfur” movement was getting weaker by 
the day and the multiplication of armed militias in Darfur gave an apolitical view of chaos. Nobody was 
anymore responsible, especially Khartoum… 
Idriss Déby was in a different mood. He wanted to confi rm his military victory of February 2008 and 
make a few points against those in the opposition (what was left of it) and those among his kinsmen 
who had campaigned for an offi cial endorsement of the Darfur insurgencies. Many Zaghawa in Chad 
were contributing to those latter and the fi rst point Idriss Déby made was to illustrate that JEM was not 
interested in governing Darfur but Sudan. Many important contributors (especially from Zaghawa/Kobe) 
saw this ambition as unrealistic and decided to focus on their own Chadian interests, especially at the 
time oil revenues were no more spent on Defense only. 
Idriss Déby worked hard to play again the role he had had for nearly 15 years as the “patron” of Zaghawa, 
able to settle disputes and fi nd solutions to internal arguments. As described earlier, this policy was costly 
for a number of reasons in Chad and also obliged Idriss Déby to send troops beyond the border to restore 
his authority. Chadian security operatives worked to split groups and, sometimes, to get them into an 
agreement with Khartoum. 
However, this was not exactly the return to the situation that had prevailed before the Darfur war broke 
out in 2003. The situation in Darfur was not fully in Khartoum’s control and many local actors were playing 
their own game, though claiming allegiance to Khartoum. The marriage of Idriss Déby in January 2012 
with the daughter of Musa Hilal illustrated the caution of Déby in front of Khartoum. In Western countries, 
this latter is seen as the fi rst Janjaweed Paramount Commander who committed mass atrocities in 2003 
and 2004.35 This is true but incomplete. After 2006, Musa Hilal played a different role and contributed to 
cool down tensions between communities and even strike peace deals at the customary level. His attitude 
is reminiscent of many other Darfuri Arab leaders who fought for Khartoum and eventually felt that they 
had been used for the best interest of the rulers against their own ambitions in Darfur. By 2015, Musa 
Hilal is an autonomous player with whom Khartoum has to behave carefully as the situation in Darfur is 
more violent than over the past years.36
While this agreement between Khartoum and N’Djamena is useful even to secure the three-border 
area, there are plenty of differences in the way both capital cities assess the situation in Libya. 
Khartoum has a long time commitment with the Libyan Islamists since it hosted most of them and 
helped them to overthrow Muammar Qaddafi. Idriss Déby had no real ally until he reconciled with 
General Hafter in September 2016. He indeed opposed the CIA funded project led by Haftar in 1988 
to overthrow the Libyan regime. While both figures are supported by Washington, it is unclear 
whether the real point of Déby talking to Haftar was Libya or the behavior of the Chadian military 
opponents there. 
According to the military and political dynamics in Libya, Khartoum and N’Djamena may soon fi nd 
themselves at loggerheads. The security agreement between them may survive this discrepancy but not 
to the point that the Chad-Libya border area would become insecure.
35 Alex de Waal, “Counter-Insurgency on the cheap”, London Review of Books, vol. 26, n° 15, 5 August 2004, pp. 25-27.
36 Jérôme Tubiana, “The Chaos in Darfur”, ICG Africa Briefing, n° 110, April 2015. And on Musa Hilal current political strategy: 
http://www.democracyfirstgroup.org/musa-hilals-awakening-the-government-of-sudans-worst-nightmare/
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AN EMERGING REGIONAL MILITARY POWER?
Chad has proven a reliable counter-terrorism partner for France and USA over the two last years. While 
ECOWAS member states were procrastinating on building up a military coalition to confront radical 
Islamist armed groups in northern Mali, Idriss Déby Itno took the unprecedented step to send 2,000 
troops to Mali through Niger and fi ght militants in northern Mali.37 Two years later, the same sense of 
initiative pushed Idriss Déby to pre-empt the threat of Boko Haram and launch an offensive coordinated 
with Cameroonian and Nigerien forces against the Jihadi movement.
What are the structural conditions that allowed Chad to appear suddenly as a regional military power? 
Four conditions are considered here: a regional demand and supply; a fi nancial capability; somewhat 
ambivalent relations with the international community; an effi cient military apparatus because trained 
through a civil war.
A regional demand and supply situation 
One needs a specifi c situation by which the region calls for one state to act decisively and that state 
is ready to do so. Idriss Déby did not take those diffi cult decisions just by himself, without having had 
discussions with his colleagues from the region and even with other offi cials outside the continent. 
In the early 2010s, Idriss Déby mentioned that he would prefer to be within ECOWAS which was more 
dynamic and better considered than with the Central African francophone regional organization, 
CEMAC (Communauté économique et monétaire d’Afrique centrale), certainly one of the weakest ones on the 
continent. He also developed a good working relation with Guinea and Niger heads of State, even though 
his relations with Paul Biya, François Bozizé and Denis Sassou Nguesso were not as warm. Alpha Condé 
and Mohamadou Issoufou were advocating in Paris a role for Chad in northern Mali long before Serval 
operation took off. Paul Biya was reluctant toward Idriss Déby up to the moment he had to acknowledge 
that his own military would be humiliated by Boko Haram. Nigeria, usually, would not have permitted 
such a bold move by neighbors’ armies but it was not anymore a normal period. Goodluck Jonathan had 
already recruited Southern African mercenaries to compensate the weakness of his own army and, 
allegedly, agreed to fund the Chadian offensive that could have saved his re-election. 
Idriss Déby was eager to play such a role for internal political reasons and also for strengthening his 
relations with Paris and Washington. Idriss Déby had tried to mitigate internal tensions among his main 
social constituency by providing positions within the state apparatus and especially the security and 
military for the youth of his own Bideyat group. This has been costly and brought also new problems 
originating in petty rivalries between different contingents and in career management. A way to reduce 
tensions was to project outside parts of this military apparatus. 
Not rich but ready to spend 
Claiming to be a regional military power does not amount to behave as if being part of a peacekeeping 
operation. Initiatives have to be taken without fi rst negotiating with other institutions (AU, UN). Certainly, 
the best proof of identity is to put troops on the frontline without asking support, funding and others’ 
endorsement. 
What Idriss Déby did twice was not to wait for a UNSC resolution or even an AU statement, even though legal 
dispositions were taken retrospectively. His time for decision did not follow diplomatic timing: it anticipated it. 
37 Roland Marchal, “Military (mis)adventures in Mali”, African Affairs, vol. 112, n° 448, 2013, pp. 486-497. 
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Of course, he did not care much about international bodies. In January 2010, Chad asked the MINURCAT 
to leave and all peacekeepers were out the country by end of May 2010. At this occasion, Idriss Déby was 
absolutely undiplomatic and made a number of allegations against the international body. As a response, 
the UN never considered seriously to appoint a Chadian general force commander for the MINUSMA, 
which made Déby’s sarcasms against the MINISMA recurrent.
The ability to move troops does not resort to a sole military capability. Chad was ready to spend a 
signifi cant amount of money without being sure to be reimbursed but it did so just to make a point. One 
cannot know or pretend that N’Djamena was confi dent to get reimbursed up to the last penny. Chad 
contingent in northern Cameroon allegedly costs FCFA 6 billion by week in spring 2015. It is still unclear 
who is going to settle the bill. Washington and Paris are clearly relieved by Chad military involvement 
in Mali, Cameroon and Nigeria. Consequently, they may generously refund its costs or, at the very least, 
use their infl uence to ease Chad’s fi nancial tensions as illustrated by France support to get access to the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (over one billion US dollars in irrevocable debt relief). 
An ambivalent relation with the international community
It would be wrong to assume that a would-be regional military power has to be a good student in the 
class room. Idriss Déby enjoys a mixed record at the regional and international levels. Idriss Déby is 
often seen as a manipulative operator ready for unholy alliances (notably with Muammar Qaddafi  and 
nowadays Omar al-Bashir). Idriss Déby’s best friends at the international level are not blind on his major 
weaknesses: embezzlement of public funding, disappearance of too challenging opponents, rigging of 
elections, narrow family networks controlling all state assets, and so on and so forth. 
These criticisms are rarely expressed loudly and publicly but they explain why some window dressing 
decisions are often taken just before a trip to Paris.38 The endorsement of Idriss Déby is often the outcome 
of a hyper-realistic (and very tactical) assessment of the regional situation. This ambivalence actually 
is not negative in consolidating Chad status as an emergent military power. It proves that Chad’s ruler 
follows his own views and is not a client state that would simply obey instructions given by other more 
powerful patrons in the continent or elsewhere. This kind of autonomy is rare in Africa, one should admit 
and this makes it one important parameter of power.
A civil war military apparatus
Last but not least, the troops have to prove effi cient. Losses are everywhere an issue and the offi cial 
acknowledgement of casualties is met by mixed reactions from the public. French military offi cers use 
to say that Chadian military are more warriors than soldiers in the sense that they courageously follow 
their leaders without using much what they might have learned in war colleges. They obey their leaders, 
not always their offi cers. This deserves a few remarks. 
One can often hear that Zaghawa and Gorane are “warrior ethnic groups”, which explains why, despite 
their demographic minority, they make up the backbone of the Chadian ruling elite. This is debatable 
in many ways. One can admit that feuds and wars are normal facts of life in those communities, which 
certainly provides sources for a warrior repertory. Yet, France was liberated in the Second World War 
by Chadian “tirailleurs sénégalais” who happened to be recruited mostly from southern Chad, CAR and 
Cameroon.39 At that time, the “warrior ethnic group” was Sara, not Zaghawa. If those latter dominate 
today, one may have to look for better reasons than primordial identities. 
38 In May 2015, Chadian police officers who shot children two months before were rearrested after having been released.
39 One should refer here to the work of Eric Jennings, La France libre fut africaine, Paris, Editions Perrin, 2014.
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Chad military apparatus is mainly made up of people who fought in the different episodes of the civil war 
from 1960s up to Hissène Habré and/or were recruited in the 2000s while the succession crisis translated 
in a series of military confrontations. It is an army of civil war that got its experience fi ghting its own 
population. It is not an army trained in military colleges, which explains also why the chain of command 
is often far from what is taught or written in the books. What also make the difference (or at least part 
of it) are equipment and salary. The DGSSIE is much stronger than the ordinary military, not especially 
because it recruits in a tiny section of the population but because all sophisticated military hardware 
and chief of staff capabilities are controlled by the former, not the latter. Moreover, salaries in Chad are 
not only defi ned by the rank and the seniority: other more informal factors impact on the earning of 
those “corps habillés”.40 
Although Chad may appear as a strong military partner of Western states in a troubled region, one should 
be aware of its internal vulnerabilities and that giving Chad a strategic role in counter-terrorism could 
become quickly counterproductive not only if the country goes into a political turmoil since the current 
status quo is creating the conditions for a major crisis. More attention should be given to alternative 
thinking, which is today neither the case in Paris nor in Washington.41
Chad Western allies may need to answer a very simple question. If as often implicitly said in public 
discourses, they defend global values against terrorist groups, why are there so many allies who do 
not share those values, win all elections, and allow their army to shoot their own population? By only 
stressing the military dimension in countering Islamist armed groups, Western countries support allies 
who rule countries that need drastic political changes not to become hotbed for Jihadi groups and make 
those political changes more unlikely. 
40 Marielle Debos, op. cit. See also the issue of Politique africaine: “Corps habillés. Politique des métiers de l’ordre”, 
n° 128, April 2012. 
41 Margot Shorey and Benjamin Nickels, “Chad: a precarious counterterrorism partner”, Counter Terrorism Center Sentinel, vol. 8, 
n° 4, April 2015, available at https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/CTCSentinel-Vol8Issue44.pdf.
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L’engagement du Tchad au Mali en janvier 2013, et dans tous les Etats voisins les années suivantes, 
donne une image de force à un régime qui est également vu comme de plus en plus fragile. 
Cette contradiction peut être comprise si l’on analyse la dynamique des événements qui ont 
décidé, lors des deux dernières décennies, le président Idriss Déby Itno à jouer avec succès la 
carte du principal allié régional de l’Occident contre le terrorisme dans la région du Sahel. 
Les raisons de ce succès sont enracinées dans sa gestion des tensions internes comme dans sa 
capacité à se positionner de façon astucieuse dans des polarisations régionales. Ces politiques 
ont permis le développement d’un appareil militaire impressionnant. Les revenus du pétrole 
ont été cruciaux dans l’acquisition de ce pouvoir, mais l’économie rentière a eu des effets à 
long terme négatifs en accroissant l’avidité de l’élite dirigeante et des proches du président, 
et en affaiblissant la légitimité du régime parmi les populations marginalisées. La capacité 
de projeter des troupes au-delà des frontières du pays apparaît ambiguë, notamment après 
la chute des cours du pétrole, en 2014. Elle a exacerbé les contradictions internes au régime 
autant qu’elle a construit de nouvelles alliances régionales et internationales pour trouver des 
ressources fi nancières et politiques alternatives, de façon à conserver une machine militaire 
Chad involvement in Mali in January 2013 and in all neighboring states throughout the following 
years gives an image of strength to a regime that is also seen as increasingly fragile. This 
discrepancy can be understood by analyzing the dynamic of events over the last two decades, 
which convinced President Idriss Déby Itno to play successfully the card of the West’s main 
regional ally against terrorism in the Sahel region. Reasons are rooted in his management of 
internal tensions as well as in a shrewd stance in regional polarizations in the 2000s. An outcome 
of these policies was the development of an impressive military apparatus. Oil revenues were key 
to acquire this power but the rentier economy had long-term negative effects in increasing greed 
among the ruling elite and president relatives, and weakening the regime legitimacy among the 
marginalized population. The ability to project troops over Chad borders appears ambiguous, 
especially after international oil price collapsed in 2014. It exorcises internal contradictions 
within the regime as much as it builds new regional and international alliances to get alternative 
fi nancial and political resources to keep a military machine that, besides popular protests, has 
become a source of potential destabilization. 
Une puissance militaire émergente en Afrique centrale ? Le Tchad d’Idriss Déby
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